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WAR is a notorious interferer with liberty. This is so ine--itably since
military necessities do not brook the delays which characterize the
deliberations of civil life. Everyone knows the tendency to impose
uniformity of thought and behavior during uar, and that the executive
arm of the government tends to encroach upon the liberty of the in-
dividual in all the areas protected by the Bill of Rights-freedom of
expression, freedom of motion and freedom from arbitrary punishment.
In considerifig the extent to which such infringement is constitu-
tionally permissible, we must apply certain general concepts to the
relations between the various constitutional provisions. The Constitu-
tion both authorizes war and protects freedom. Obviously no one of its
provisions has greater force than any other. The Bill of Rights and
those provisions of the original Constitution which affect freedom do
not lose their efficacy because Congress, in the exercise of its constitu-
tional power, has declared war. That this is so 'with regard to the
habeas corpus guarantee is apparent on its face, since in express terms
that guarantee contemplates a state of war. The same is true also with
regard to trial by jury, freedom of expression and guarantee of due
process.
While it is true that the Bill of Rights persists even in wartime it
cannot be denied that war can affect the meaning of some of its provi-
sions. For instance, the rights of freedom of speech and of the press are
not absolute. Their meaning, in peace as well as in war, depends upon
the circumstances under which they are exercised. Freedom of expres-
sion may conflict with other essential functioning of a democratic
community. Thus the question has arisen whether an employer's
freedom of speech may be restricted by an administrative agency con-
cerned with preventing industrial strife.' Again the right of a munic-
ipality to tax the sale of leaflets may collide with freedom of religion
*Since this article deals only with personal rights it has not discussed Yakus v. United
States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944), opinion by the Chief Justice, dissenting opinions by Mr. Justice
Roberts and Mr. Justice Rutledge; the latter dissent concurred in by Mr. Justice Murphy.
There the majority held that a defendant in a criminal prosecution under the Emergency
Price Control Act could not challenge the correctness of the O.P.A. order he was charged
with violating. Congress had established an eoxclusive method for maling such a challenge
which was valid and must be followed. The dissenters e.pressed the view that the method
provided in the law for challenge of orders lacked due process. Nor do 'e consider at all
cases such as Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944); Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322
U. S. 398 (1944).
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469 (1941).
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or the press.2 The line between such criticism of the courts as is pro-
tected by the Constitution and such as may be punished as contempt of
court remains clearly to be drawn.'
It is not strange, therefore, that war should present special problems
in the particular field of freedom of expression. Freedom of the press
has a different meaning in war time from that which it has in time of
peace. No one would challenge the government's right to forbid pub-
lication of statements which could convey valuable information to the
enemy. And so, censorship of news of military importance becomes
inevitable in wartime, when it would not be tolerated in time of peace.
By no means does it follow, however, that in wartime it becomes
proper to suppress all expression of opinion hostile to the war or its
purposes. Naturally, the majority, when war appears imminent or has
actually occurred, desires to impose unification of opinion on the coun-
try. Attempts are then made to silence dissenters, sometimes by execu-
tive action suppressing meetings or newspapers, sometimes by banning
material from the mails, sometimes by criminal prosecution. The right of
the government to pursue these courses has been both attacked and
defended by men whose devotion to the ideals of our country remains
unquestioned.
Thus Jefferson opposed, as unconstitutional, the restrictive Alien
and Sedition Act sponsored by his predecessor, Adams. 4 On the other
hand, Lincoln sought to justify the detention of numerous persons
without trial by the argument that, while he was engaged in saving
the main body of the Constitution, a temporary deviation from its
provisions would produce no permanent harm any more than would a
patient of necessity acquire the habit of using emetics simply because
these had been prescribed for him during a serious illness.'
It is, however, more difficult to justify interference with personal
liberty during wartime than it is to justify some restriction on freedom
of expression. Certainly this is true in connection with prosecutions for
crime. The various provisions of the Bill of Rights on this subject are
very explicit indeed and can hardly be interpreted one way in time of
peace and another way in wartime. The safeguards of indictment and
jury trial, the rights to counsel and to confrontation of witnesses apply
to ordinary crimes at all times, and no sound basis exists for disregard-
2. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942), vacated 319 U. S. 103 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Follett
v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 66 Sup. Ct. 276 (U. S.
1946).
3. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941); see also Pennekamp v. Florida, 22 So.
(2d) 875 (Fla. 1945) cert. granted, 66 Sup. Ct. 146 (U. S. 1945).
4. Letter to Stephens T. Mason, Oct. 11, 1798, 7 TE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JvrFER
SON (Ford's ed. 1896) 282-3. See also Virginia Resolutions sponsored by Jefferson.
5. Letter to Honorable Erastus Coming and others, June 12, 1863, 2 AnRAHAMx LIN-
COLN-COMPLETE WORKS (Nicolay and Hay ed. 1894) 345.
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ing them except where the status of the individual brings him under
military law. And even then, as we shall see, problems arise as to the
application here of the due process clause.
Additional aspects of personal liberty come into question when,
through the declaration of martial law or even the mere exercise of
authority by the military, the freedom of an individual is interfered
with without his subjection to criminal prosecution. No express con-
stitutional guarantees exist in this field other than the right to invoke
the writ of habeas corpus. The controversy which raged during the
Civil War as to where the power resided to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus has had no recent replica. In the continental United States the
writ has not since that time been suspended.
Different criteria must be applied in deciding whether particular
executive acts transcend constitutional barriers, depending on the
nature of the guarantees affected. If the guarantee is of the procedural
character specified in the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendments, no
difficult philosophical problem need arise. The main determining factor
should then be one of classification only. Is the person involved sub-
ject to military law or is he not? There should, therefore, be no ques-
tion of weighing alleged military necessity in this field. On the other
hand, in dealing with the rights specified in the First Amendment or
with the liberty of the individual not protected by specific guarantees
more complicated questions can be considered. Here there may be a
balancing of conflicting interests. Paramount military needs car.
properly be weighed; and the "clear and present danger" test 6 applied.
In the last analysis, decisions will be determined by the relative
values judges give to the two apparently antagonistic needs of a com-
munity at war: the immediate necessity for winning the war and the
everlasting requirement that liberty be preserved. To some extent,
of course, particular decisions will be affected by the accident of time.
In the days before the outcome of a war is clear, courts 1will be inclined
to favor the present need over the future freedom. Once the war is
won, ideals of liberty become more persuasive. Throughout all these
upheavals the United States Supreme Court remains, of course, the
final arbiter between the liberties of the individual and the war power
wielded by the executive. In every war it has been called on to exercise
this great function.
The war just ended has been no exception. The Supreme Court has,
however, followed no such pattern of acquiescence in governmental
action as marred the Court's record in the cases which arose out of the
First World War. Then the Court upheld all the convictions brought
before it under the Espionage Act,7 allowed the Postmaster General
6. Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7. Commencing with Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919) through Pierce v.
United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920) (in this and some other cases Mr. Justice Holm= and
Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented).
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great powers of censorship,8 and refused to interfere with state wartime
restrictions on liberty.'
This time the Supreme Court has shown greater wisdom and keener
discrimination. Some credit for the result is due the Roosevelt Ad-
ministrations, whose officials allowed greater latitude to anti-war
views than had been permitted under President Wilson. The great
body of civil liberties law developed in the nineteen thirties under the
leadership of Chief Justice Hughe 1 had also had its effect. But before
that influence had gathered momentum the Court decided a group of
cases related to our topic, the impact of which is still felt.
In 1926 Rosika Schwimmer, who had been one of the sponsors of the
Peace Ship of 1916, attempted to become an American citizen. As re-
quired by governmental regulations but not by any Act of Congress,
she was asked to answer a question regarding her willingness to bear
arms. Because she declared that her views as a pacifist forbade an
affirmative answer the Supreme Court denied her application on the
ground that she was not attached to the principles of the Constitution."1
Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Sanford dissented. And when the same
question came up several years later in the cases of Professor Mac-
intosh 12 and Marie Bland 1' the Court held to its earlier view. This
time Chief Justice Hughes, who had just rejoined the Court after his
unsuccessful bid for the Presidency, wrote the dissenting opinion, con-
curred in by Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone, the latter having
changed his views. However, none of the dissenters questioned the
power of Congress to bar pacifists from citizenship; they merely be-
lieved that Congress had not intended doing so. Although for many
years the Court refused to depart from the rule laid down by these
8. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255
U. S. 407 (1921) (Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented). In contrast to
the views there expressed see Hannegan v. Esquire, 66 Sup. Ct. 429 (U. S. 1946). This case
had nothing to do with war, however.
9. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920). Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in the
result; Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented (as also Mr. Chief Justice White, but on a narrow
ground). Cf. 'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) (Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice
Brandeis dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) (Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring specially).
10. See Fraenkel, One Hundred and Fifty Years of the Bill of Rights (1939) 23 MiNN. L.
Rnv. 719; FRAENKEL, OuR CIVIL LIBERTIES (1944).
11. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644 (1929) (opinion by Mr. Justice Butler;
dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, concurred in by Mr. Justice Brandeis; Mr. Justice
Sanford dissented on the basis of the Circuit Court's opinion).
12. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931) (opinion by Mr. Justice Suther.
land; dissenting opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes,
Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone).
13. United States v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636 (1931) (opinion by Mr. Justice Sutherland;
dissenting opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr.
Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone).
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cases and until recently even expanded it, at last on April 22, 1946, it
reached a different conclusion and expressly overruled the earlier cases
in Girouard v. United States.'4 The late Chief Justice announced a dis-
senting opinion just before he was stricken and died. In this he was
joined by Justices Reed and Frankfurter.
Another, much later, group of cases also touches our subject. The
witnesses of Jehovah interpret the Bible literally and will honor no
secular symbol, not even the flag. In consequence their children have
in many communities been expelled from schools because of their
refusal to salute the flag. At first the Supreme Court refused even to
hear argument in these cases, brought from various state courts.15
Then, in 1940, in Minersitille Sciwol District v. Gobilis,ic it upheld the
challenged state action. Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, said
that since the state had the right to promote patriotism, the courts
could not scrutinize the means employed. He stressed the importance
of national cohesion: "National unity is the basis of national security."
Only Justice Stone dissented. Three years later, however, the Court
reversed itself.'7 Some of the other members had already expressed
regret at their earlier decision;18 only Justices Roberts and Reed now
stood by Justice Frankfurter. The new opinion, by Justice Jackson,
eloquently proclaimed that compulsory unification of opinion was
contrary to the essential character of our government.
By the time this decision came down we were at war and the first
of the strictly war cases had been decided. That was Ex parte Quirin,20
the case of the Nazi saboteurs landed on our shores by submarine. They
had challenged the right of the government to try them by military
commission, arguing that they were entitled to the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, to be indicted by a grand jury and tried before a petit
jury. The government questioned their right to appeal to the courts
at all. In an opinion by Chief Justice Stone the Supreme Court unani-
mously upheld their right to judicial scrutiny of their claims, but
rejected them all. The Court accepted the government's contention
that the men were subject to military trial because they had entered
the country surreptitiously. It ruled that none of the specific guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights on which they had relied applied to military
trials.
14. Girouard v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 826 (U. S. 1946).
15. Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. (2d) 85, 82 P. (2d) 391 (1938), ccrt. den fel 306
U. S. 621 (1939); Leoles v. Landers, 184 Ga. 5S0, 192 S. E. 218 (1937), a(ppa4 diswissci 302
U. S. 656 (1937); Hering v. State Board of Education, 118 N. J. L. 566, 194 Ad. 177 (1937),
appeal dismissed 303 U. S. 624 (1938).
16. 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
17. West Virginia State Board v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
18. Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Douglas in Jones v. Opa-
lika, 316 U.S. 584, 623 (1942).
19. 317 U. S. 1 (1942) (opinion by the late Chief Justice; Mr. Justice Murphy too!: no
part).
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Since then the Court has dealt with a great variety of wartime sub-
jects. Yet a review of the current wartime decisions leaves one with
mixed emotions. The reason is readily seen after a brief comparison
of the cases in which the Court upheld individual liberty with those in
which it supported the government. Even an extended discussion of
the more important of these cases leaves doubt of the basic position
the Court took. Only Justice Murphy has been consistent throughout;
the late Chief Justice and Justice Frankfurter were often in agreement
at the opposite pole.
Unanimity in these decisions has been rare, but not entirely absent.
All the Justices agreed that a Mississippi statute improperly infringed
free speech because it made utterances "calculated to encourage dis-
.loyalty" a criminal offense; 20 that cancellation of citizenship for mere
expression of pro-Nazi opinion was improper; 21 and that loyal citizens
of Japanese ancestry could not be detained against their will in the relo-
cation centers to which they had been evacuated after Pearl Harbor.22
The majority of the Court refused to be stampeded by any red bogey,
in either denaturalization or deportation proceedings.2 3 Three convic-
tions were set aside by five to four decisions for insufficiency of proof;
in one case, 24 because circulation of anti-war documents did not in-
dicate an intent to cause insubordination in the armed forces; in a
treason case,2" for lack of the two witnesses required by the Constitu-
tion; in the third, 2 under the Draft Act, because no intent to evade
the draft had been established, merely by the showing that officers of
the German-American Bund had advised members not to register
20. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583 (1943) (opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts).
21. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944) (opinion by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy, in which Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice
Douglas and Mr. Justice Rutledge joined).
22. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, con-
curring opinions by Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Murphy).
23. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943) (opinion by Mr. Justice Mur-
phy, concurring opinions by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Rutledge; dissenting
opinion by the Chief Justice, in which Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
joined. Mr. Justice Jackson took no part). Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 (1945) (opinion
by Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy; dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Stone, in which Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined. Mr.
Justice Jackson took no part).
24. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U. S. 680 (1944) (opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy,
concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts; dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Reed, in which
Messrs. Justices Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson joined). The narrow scope of this case is
indicated by the denial of certiorari in Gordon v. United States, 138 F. (2d) 174 (C. C. A.
7th, 1943), cert. denied 320 U. S. 728 (1943). The only difference is that Gordon urged
Negroes not to fight for the United States, while Hartzel made no specific reference to the
armed forces.
25. Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1 (1945) (opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson; dis-
senting opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, in which the Chief Justice and Messrs. Justices
Black and Reed joined).
26. Keegan v. United States, 325 U. S. 478 (1945) (opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts,
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until the application of the law to them had been determined. Finally,
over dissents by Justices Burton and Frankfurter, the Court has ruled
that the army had no right to try civilians in Hawaii in 1942 and 1944.
On the other hand, in 1943 the Court refused to review the convic-
tion of a group of Minneapolis Trotzkyites charged with violation of
the Smith peacetime Sedition Act, because, before Pearl Harbor, they
had circulated anti-war statements and the usual Marxist "revolu-
tionary" literature.2 In addition, the Court unanimously upheld the
curfew orders issued as a preliminary to the West Coast evacuation of
Japanese-Americans 29 and, over the dissents of Justices Murphy and
Jackson, upheld the evacuation itself."9 By a five to four vote Illinois
was allowed to exclude a pacifist from admission to the bar.31 The
Court refused to interfere with the military tribunals which sentenced
Generals Yamashita and Homma to death for atrocities committed by
their troops.32 Finally, the Court failed, until it was too late to be of
service to the majority of those involved, to find any way by which
selective service classifications could be reviewed before actual induc-
tion into the armed forces.
II
The lineup of the Court in the war cases has varied considerably.
Justices Reed and Douglas dissented in all three of the five to four
decisions in which criminal convictions were reversed, joined twice by
concurring opinions by Messrs. Justices Black and Rutledge; dizssenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Stone, joined by Messrs. Justices Douglas, Reed and JacLon).
27. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 66 Sup. Ct. 606 (U. S. 1946) (opinion by Mr. Justice
Black, concurring opinions by Messrs. Justices Stone and Murphy; dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Burton, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Mr. Justice Jackson tool no part).
28. Dunne v. United States, 138 F. (2d) 137 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943), cerl. denied 320 U.S.
790 (1943), rehearing denied, 320 U. S. 814, 815 (1944). The refusal to grant certiorari is
particularly surprising because the lower courts had held the "dear and precent danger"
test inapplicable. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941) where this test had been.
declared to be "the minimum protection to which the individual was entitled."
29. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943) (opinion by the Chief Justice,
concurring opinions by Messrs. Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge). This cace also
involved the evacuation issue, but decision on this was avoided then because the scntence
on both counts ran concurrently, and approval of the count based on the violation of the
curfew order sufficed to sustain the conviction.
30. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944) (opinion by Mr. Justice Black,
concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter; dissenting opinions by Messrs. Justice
Roberts, Murphy and Jackson).
31. In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945) (opinion by Mr. Justice Reed; dizsenting
opinion by Mr. Justice Black in which Messrs. Justices Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge
joined).
32. Application of Yamashita, 66 Sup. Ct. 340 (U. S. 1946) (opinion by the late Chief
Justice). Application of Homma, 66 Sup. Ct. 515 (U. S. 1946) per curiam memorandum,
(Dissenting opinions in each case by Messrs. Justices Murphy and Rutledge. Mr. Justice
Iackson took no part in either of these cases).
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the Chief Justice and Justice Jackson and once (although in different
cases) by Justices Frankfurter and Black. The late Chief Justice and
Justices Roberts and Frankfurter composed the minority in both the
cases which involved Communists. In the Hawaiian martial law cases,
Justices Burton and Frankfurter dissented.
On the other side of the judicial ledger, Justices Douglas, Murphy
and Rutledge refused to agree with all the implications of the curfew
decision, although they approved the result reached; and in the evacua-
tion case Justices Roberts, Murphy and Jackson dissented. In the
pacifist lawyer's case the dissenters were Justices Black, Douglas,
Murphy and Rutledge and in the draft conspiracy case, Justices Frank-
furter, Roberts, Murphy and Rutledge. Only Justices Murphy and
Rutledge disagreed with the majority in the cases involving the Japa-
nese generals.
Thus in all the cases in which the Court decided against the govern-
ment, Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge were the bulwark of the
majority-except in the treason case, where Justice Black dissented.
But Justice Murphy alone consistently dissented when the majority
upheld the government. Justice Jackson took no part in several of
these cases, in some instances on account of his former position as
Attorney General, and in the latest ones due to his absence as prosecu-
tor in Niiremburg. Except in three of these numerous cases, wherever
there was any difference of opinion among the justices, the late Chief
Justice was on the "wrong" side.
It should be noted, moreover, that in few of the cases which upset
governmental action did the Court lay down any basic constitutional
principles. Its failure to do so led, in several of the instances, to special
concurring opinions: In the Bund Denaturalization case,"3 the majority
confined itself to discussion of the facts. Justice Murphy,34 however,
speaking also for Justices Black, Douglas and Rutledge, stressed the
right of the naturalized citizen, as well as the native born, to the full
exercise of freedom of speech. In the Bridges case,35 in which the other
justices ruled only that the hearing had been unfair, Justice Murphy 11
filed an eloquent protest against the failure of the majority to deal with
the basic constitutional issues presented. He said: 11
"Deportation, with all its grave consequences, should not be
sanctioned on such weak and unconvincing proof of a real and
imminent threat to our national security. Congress has ample
power to protect the United States from internal revolution and
anarchy without abandoning the ideals of freedom and tolerance.
33. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665 (1944).
34. Id. at 678.
35. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 (1945).
36. Id. at 157.
37. Id. at 165-6.
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We as a nation lose part of our greatness whenever we deport or
punish those who merely exercise their freedoms in an unpopular
though innocuous manner. The strength of this nation is weakened
more by those who suppress the freedom of others than by those
who are allowed freely to think and act as their consciences dictate.
"Our concern in this case does not halt with the fate of Harry
Bridges, an alien whose constitutional rights have been grossly vio-
lated. The significance of this case is far reaching. The liberties of
the 3,400,000 other aliens in this nation are also at stake. Many of
these aliens, like many of our forebears, were driven from their
original homelands by bigoted authorities who denied the existence
of freedom and tolerance. It would be a dismal prospect for them to
discover that their freedom in the United States is dependent upon
their conformity to the popular notions of the moment. But they
need not make that discovery. The Bill of Rights belongs to them
as well as to all citizens. It protects them as long as they reside
within the boundaries of our land. It protects them in the exercise
of the great individual rights necessary to a sound political and
economic democracy. Neither injunction, fine, imprisonment, nor
deportation can be utilized to restrict or prevent the exercise of in-
tellectual freedom. Only by zealously guarding the rights of the
most humble, the most unorthodox and the most despised among
us can freedom flourish and endure in our land."
In Ex parte Mitsuye Endo 31 the majority decided only that Con-
gress had not authorized the challenged detention in a relocation center
for Japanese-Americans evacuated from the West Coast. Justices
Murphy 11 and Roberts 0 alone discussed the constitutional issues left
unmentioned by the majority. Here Justice Murphy described what
had been done as an "unconstitutional resort to racism inherent in the
entire evacuation program." 41
In the Hawaiian martial law case, Duncan v. Kahanamoku,42 the
majority dealt primarily with the meaning of the Organic Act of
Hawaii. They concluded that Congress, in authorizing the establish-
ment of martial law, had neither intended to make any special rules in
this field with regard to Hawaii, nor contemplated trials of civilians
by military courts. Mr. Justice Black noted that the case did not
involve a situation of military rule over an area from which civilians
had been evacuated nor any specialized effort by the military to en-
force only those'orders which related to military functions. He stressed
the importance of subordinating the military to the civilian authority
and said that he believed that Congress "did not wish to exceed the
38. 323 U. S. 233 (1944).
39. Id. at 307.
40. Id. at 308.
41. Id. at 307.
42. 66 Sup. Ct. 606 (U. S. 1946).
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boundaries between military and civilian power in which our people
have always believed, which responsible military and executive officers
had heeded, and which had become part of our political philosophy and
institutions." 41
The concurrence of the late Chief Justice 4" was on the narrow ground
that the conditions in Hawaii, at least after February 1942, did not
involve such a threat to public safety as to justify the substitution of
trials by military tribunals for trials in the civil courts.
Justice Murphy 41 dealt with broader constitutional issues. He be-
lieved that the "open court" rule of Ex parte Milligan 1 was the proper
criterion for determining the limits of military trials. He dealt as fol-
lows with the argument of military necessity: 41
"The argument thus advanced is as untenable today as it was
when cast in the language of the Plantagenets, the Tudors and the
Stuarts. It is a rank appeal to abandon the fate of all our liberties
to the reasonableness of the judgment of those who are trained
primarily for war. It seeks to justify military usurpation of civilian
authority to punish crime without regard to the potency of the
Bill of Rights. It deserves repudiation."
Mr. Justice Murphy discussed at length the various specific reasons.
advanced by the government, some of which had been accepted in the
Circuit Court of Appeals. In the course of this discussion, he declared
as follows: 48
"From time immemorial despots have used real or imagined
threats to the public welfare as an excuse for needlessly abrogating
human rights. That excuse is no less unworthy of our traditions
when used in this day of atomic warfare or at a future time when
some other type of warfare may be devised. The right to jury
trial and the other constitutional rights of an accused individual
are too fundamental to be sacrificed merely through a reasonable
fear of military assault. There must be some overpowering factor
that makes a recognition of those rights incompatible with the pub-
lic safety before we should consent to their temporary suspension.
If those rights may safely be respected in the face of a threatened
invasion no valid reason exists for disregarding them. In other
words, the civil courts must be utterly incapable of trying criminals
or of dispensing justice in their usual manner before the Bill of
Rights may be temporarily suspended. 'Martial law [in relation to
closing the courts] cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The
43. Id. at 615-6.
44. Id. at 620.
45. Id. at 616.
46. 4Wall. 1 (U.S. 1866).
47. 66 Sup. Ct. 606, at 618.
48. Ibid.
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necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as
effectively closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.'
Ex parte lMilligan, 4 Wall. 1, at page 127."
The dissenters began their opinion with a declaration of adherence-
to the Bill of Rights. However, they pointed out that, since the Con-
stitution expressly provides for waging war and vests the war power in
the executive, the Court should refrain from over-expanding its con-
trol into the field allotted to another branch of government. They
rejected the criteria relied upon by the majority and believed that the
executive power in wartime was supreme in any area which could be
described as the "theatre of actual military operations." They cited
the declarations made immediately after Pearl Harbor as a recognition
by the executive that Hawaii constituted a theatre of war.
The dissenting opinion seems somewhat confused in that it recog-
nizes limits to the extent to which executive discretion can constitu-
tionally delay restoration of civilian control. The opinion indicates no
criterion for determining when the judiciary can differ with the military
as to the propriety of the delay. Whatever uncertainty may remain,
due to difference of opinion among the justices as to the constitutional
power of Congress to permit military trials of civilians while the civil
courts are open, it is clear the Supreme Court will not permit such
trials to be held in the absence of specific congressional authorization.
It is to be regretted, nevertheless, that the majority did not seize this
opportunity to reaffirm the rule of the Milligan case and did not deal
with the question on a fundamental basis.
Only in the treason case, Cramer v. United States," did the Court
discuss fundamental problems. Here, although the chief difference be-
tween the judges concerned interpretation of the evidence, the majority
discussed at length the meaning of the treason clause in the Constitu-
tion. After reviewing the treason prosecutions with which the framers
of the Constitution were acquainted, and the proceedings of the Con-
stitutional Convention itself, Mr. Justice Jackson concluded for the
majority that the Constitution requires proof by two witnesses that
the accused actually had given aid and comfort to the enemy. It was
not enough that he merely intended to give it. Mr. Justice Jackson
rejected the suggestion made by the government that the constitu-
tional requirement should be given a loose interpretation lest it be too,
difficult to convict. He thus summed the matter up: -9
"The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties
it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was
not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated
of that venerated group considered that 'prosecutions for treason
49. 325 U. S. 1 (1945).
50. Id. at 48.
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were generally virulent.' Time has not made the accusation of
treachery less poisonous, nor the task of judging one charged with
betraying the country, including his triers, less susceptible to the
influence of suspicion and rancor. The innovations made by the
forefathers in the law of treason were conceived in a faith such as
Paine put in the maxim that 'He that would make his own liberty
secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates
this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach himself.' 61 We
still put trust'in it."
For the dissenters, 52 Justice Douglas insisted there was no need to
interpret the Constitution so rigorously. He claimed it was undisputed
that Cramer knew he was befriending two of the saboteurs who had
been landed here by submarine.' 3 The dissenters maintained that the
Constitution did not require proof by two witnesses of what Cramer
had planned at his meetings with the saboteurs. It was the meetings
which constituted the overt acts required to be proved; their treason-
able character could be inferred. In any event, the dissenters pointed
out, Cramer had told the whole story on the witness stand so that
proof that he had actually helped the enemy had come from his own
lips. This, they stated, should be treated as though it were a confession
in open court, permitted as sufficient proof by the Constitution. That
point was completely ignored in the majority opinion.
In any case, this decision, while the first by the Supreme Court deal-
ing with treason, touches only on the technicalities of proof required
by the Constitution for the particular offense and has, therefore, no
bearing on other war cases.
The constitutional declarations made in the cases in which the Court
supported the government were more explicit. The decision in lMra-
bayaszi v. Ulnited States,5 4 in which the legality of the West Coast curfew
orders was upheld, rested on certain generalities with regard to the
war powers and certain particulars with regard to the Japanese-Ameri-
can population. Chief Justice Stone quoted with approval a statement
made in an article by former Chief Justice Hughes 5 to the effect that
the power to make war was "the power to wage war successfully" and
held that this extended to "every phase of the national defense." He
ruled that the courts could not review the exercise of judgment by the
executive when approved by Congress. The late Chief Justice con-
cluded that the particular situation called for such exercise, due to the
danger to the West Coast following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
large number of persons of Japanese ancestry, many of them Japanese
51. See BRooKs, THE WoRLD or WASHINGTON IRVING (1944) 73n.
52. 325 U. S. 1, 48 (1945).
53. These were among the persons involved in Ex parle Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942),
54. 320 U. S. 81 (1943).
55. (1917) 42 A. B. A. REP. 232, 238.
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subjects, and the cohesion of the group. Thus the imposition of a
curfew was justified on the score that it had a real relation to protection
against sabotage. Chief Justice Stone said also: "In time of war resi-
dents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry." He was
careful to indicate, however, that no more was being decided than that
"the curfew order as applied and at the time it was applied, was vithin
the boundaries of the war power." Yet in the later case this reserva-
tion was altogether disregarded.
None of the justices dissented in the Hirabayaslz case. Justice
Murphy -1 thought it went "to the very brink of constitutional power."
He suggested, however, that the displaced persons should not be pre-
vented from going into areas free from danger of attack. Mr. Justice
Rutledge 57 expressed doubt about the broad language of the majority
to the effect that it would not review the exercise of discretion by the
military, since he thought there might be bounds beyond which the
military could go. Justice Douglas, however,s foreshadowed the later
decision upholding evacuation and indicated that because the need was
great and the time short, "temporary treatment on a group basis"
was appropriate. He added that hearings with regard to loyalty should
be given later, but that a person affected must first obey the law and
then attack his classification.
With this decision as precedent, Mr. Justice Black dealt very sum-
marily with objections made to the evacuation orders when these came
up for consideration in Korematsu v. United States," in which the
Court affirmed the conviction of a Nisei citizen for remaining in an area
forbidden him by a military order. He said that exclusion from a war
area, like the curfew, had relation to the prevention of espionage and
sabotage. Excluding the whole group was justified, due to the lack of
time in which to sift the loyal from the disloyal. To the argument that
the evacuation order was invalid because part of a comprehensive
plan which included detention, Mr. Justice Black answered only that
it was not necessarily so, since some who were evacuated were not de-
tained. Moreover, he said the various steps were the subject of separate
orders which must be separately considered. He rejected the idea that
the case presented an issue of detention in a camp on account of racial
prejudice. Mr. Justice Frankfurter co went even further than the others
in yielding to the plea of military necessity. For he maintained that a
military order appropriate for conducting the war is as valid as an
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission within its power to
56. 320 U. S. 81, 109 (1943).
57. Id. at 114.
58. Id.at 105.
59. 323 U. S. 214 (1944).
60. Id. at 224.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
regulate commerce. The Justice forgets, however, that the due process
clause stands guardian of liberty in both cases, and that, therefore, it is
no answer merely to point out that a challenged order comes within the
scope of one or another department's constitutional field of action.
The dissents ranged over a wide field. Justice Roberts found 01 "a
clear violation of constitutional rights." He believed that the offense
did not consist of refusal to leave the area involved, but of refusal to be
imprisoned in a camp. He pointed out that Korematsu had been for-
bidden both to leave the area and to stay in his home-the only way
he could avoid violating one of these orders was to go to an assembly
center. He rejected the suggestion that Korematsu had first to go to
the camp and then sue out a writ of habeas corpus.
Mr. Justice Murphy 2 dissented on broad grounds of public policy.
He insisted that there were limits to the doctrine that military discre-
tion could not be reviewed. He could find no "immediate, imminent
and impending" public danger sufficient to justify both the racial dis-
crimination and the denial of due process here involved. He pointed
out that the military decision rested on a belief in "racial guilt" and on
non-military factors concerning which the military had no special
competence. He emphasized the fact that it had been possible to give
individual hearings to persons of German and Italian ancestry and
that the British government had given such hearings to its enemy
aliens.
Mr. Justice Jackson 63 posed the interesting theses that it was no
part of the Court's business to pass on the reasonableness of military
action and that a civil court should never enforce an order which
violates constitutional limitations. While it is refreshing to get away
from the mumbo jumbo of "discretion" and "abuse of discretion," the
question still remains what orders by military authority do violate the
Constitution. And Justice Jackson has not aided us in establishing
that criterion. He concluded only that there was a difference between
the mild and temporary deprivation of liberty involved in the curfew
order and the later evacuation program.
The opinion in Ex parte Summers, 4 in which a conscientious objector
unsuccessfully sought admission to the Illinois bar, brings into sharp
focus the different points of view among the members of the Court.
As in the flag salute cases," the line was drawn between religious
freedom and secular power. The majority, as in the first (now over-
ruled) flag salute case, relied heavily on the right of the state to decide
certain questions for itself. Mr. Justice Reed stressed the finding of
61. Id. at 225.
62. Id. at 233.
63. Id. at 245.
64. 325 U. S. 561 (1945).
65. See notes 16-18 supra.
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the Illinois Court that Summers was unable, in good faith, to take the
required oath to support the Constitution of the State, because that
Constitution contained a clause requiring military service. He re-
called that an alien refusing to pledge military service might be denied
citizenship 66 and said that the action of Illinois could not be con-
sidered a violation of religious freedom on account of an interpretation
of the state oath "when a like interpretation of a similar oath as to the
Federal Constitution bars an alien from national citizenship."
The weakness of this reliance on the pacifist citizenship cases is mani-
fest. In the first place, there may be some relationship between vil-
ingness to bear arms in support of an adopted country and becoming a
citizen. But there is no relationship whatever between bearing arms
and practicing law. As Justice Black well said,7 the State could as
easily bar a pacifist from every employment subject to its regulatory
power. Moreover, Illinois had never actually drafted anyone since the
Civil War and had exempted persons who are exempt by the laws of
the United States. Since Summers had been classified as a conscien-
tious objector by the Selective Service authorities, there was no prac-
tical likelihood of his ever being called by Illinois. The Illinois authori-
ties had conjured up a ghost in order to keep Summers from practicing
his profession.
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Black pointed out that this use of the oath
was "an abomination to the founders of this nation," for it was a test
oath "designed to impose civil disabilities upon men for their beliefs
rather than for unlawful conduct."
The concluding words of this dissent should be perpetually before
us: 6
"I cannot agree that a state can lawfully bar from a semi-public
position, a well-qualified man of good character solely because he
entertains a religious belief which might prompt him at some time
in the future to violate a law which has not yet been and may never
be enacted. Under our Constitution men are punished for what
they do or fail to do and not for what they think and believe.
Freedom to think, to believe, and to worship, has too exalted a
position in our country to be penalized on such an illusory basis."
In Application of Yamashita,9 the majority in refusing the Japanese
general writs of habeas corpus and prohibition against the American
military authorities who had sentenced him to death, dealt very
sketchily with the constitutional points which had been raised by
66. See cases cited in notes 11-13 supra, now overruled by Girouard v. United States,
66 Sup. Ct. 826 (U. S. 1946).
67. 325 U.S. 560,575 (1945).
68. Id.at578.
69. 66 Sup. Ct. 340 (U. S. 1946).
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defense counsel. However, following the saboteur case,70 they did rule
that access to the courts was available to anyone tried by a military
commission for the purpose of determining whether the commission
had jurisdiction. Justices Murphy and Rutledge,71 nevertheless, in-
sisted that even a defeated general was entitled to the protection of the
due process clause. They maintained that he had been denied due
process because his counsel had been given no fair opportunity to
prepare his defense and because the military commission was author-
ized to receive wholly improper evidence. Justice Rutledge said: 72
"It is not necessary to recapitulate. The difference between the
Court's view of this proceeding and my own comes down in the end
to the view, on the one hand, that there is no law restrictive upon
these proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations may
be prescribed for their government by the executive authority or
the military and, on the other hand, that the provisions of the
Articles of War, of the Geneva Convention and the Fifth Amend-
ment apply.
"I cannot accept the view that anywhere in our system resides
or lurks a power so unrestrained to deal with any human being
through any process of trial. What military agencies or authorities
may do with our enemies in battle or invasion, apart from proceed-
ings in the nature of trial and some semblance of judicial action, is
beside the point. Nor has any human being heretofore been held to
be wholly beyond elementary procedural protection by the Fifth
Amendment. I cannot consent to even implied departure from that
great absolute.
"It was a great patriot who said:
'He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his
enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes
a precedent that will reach himself.' "
In the Homma case, an application similar to that of Yamashita,73 the
majority wrote no opinion, but the same two dissenting judges added
to the views which they had expressed earlier. They took particular
objection to the procedure which permitted the use of confessions
obtained by torture. These justices strongly complained that the
majority decisions constituted surrender to hysteria and an abandon-
ment of constitutional principles. As Mr. Justice Murphy said: 74
"Today the lives of Yamashita and Homma, leaders of enemy
forces vanquished in the field of battle, are taken without regard
70. See note 19 supra.
71. 66 Sup. Ct. at 353, 359. They contended also that the charge did not state a recog-
nized violation of the laws of war and that the Geneva Convention of 1929 had not been
observed.
72. Id. at 378.
73. Application of Homma, 66 Sup. Ct. 515 (U. Si 1946).
74. Id.at516.
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to due process of law. There will be few to protest. But tomorrow
the precedent here established can be turned against others. A
procession of judicial lynchings without due process of law may now
follow. No one can foresee the end of this failure of objective
thining and of adherence to our high hopes of a new world. The
time for effective vigilance and protest, however, is when the
abandonment of legal procedure is first attempted. A nation must
not perish because, in the natural frenzy of the aftermath of war, it
abandoned its central theme of the dignity of the human personal-
ity and due process of law."
The decision in Girouard v. United States,75 involving the eligibility of
conscientious objectors for naturalization, touched no constitutional
question. The problem was merely one of interpreting the intent of
Congress. Mr. Justice Douglas for the majority pointed out that Con-
gress had never expressly required an applicant for citizenship to
pledge military service. He felt that to exact such a pledge as a condi-
tion of citizenship was so contrary to all of our national history that it
should not be imposed by administrative or judicial determination,
only by express Congressional action. He pointed to the fact that
Congress had in 1942 permitted all members of the armed forces (in-
cluding pacifist non-combatants) to become citizens and indicated that
if a non-combatant pacifist could take the oath, although opposed to
war, then any similarly situated pacifist should likewise be entitled to
do so, even though he had not actually served in the armed forces as a
non-combatant.
In his dissent, the late Chief Justice, who had originally dissented
with Hughes, Holmes and Brandeis in the Macintosh case, now took
the opposite view. He was motivated largely by the fact that Congress
had reenacted the laws dealing with citizenship after the earlier cases
had been decided without indicating any disagreement with them.
And this he felt constituted a legislative approval of the earlier inter-
pretation, which it was improper for the Court now to disregard.
It is to be hoped that this last decision finally sets this vexed ques-
tion at rest and that Congress will not seek to reinstate the illiberal
doctrine of the earlier cases. It is interesting to note that this is the
first case in which the most recent justice, Burton, joined the liberal
group.
Finally, the Selective Service cases call for brief comment. First are
those which deal with the proper procedure by which a registrant
might question illegal or arbitrary action by his draft board. Congress
had absolutely exempted ministers from the draft and had given
qualified exemption to conscientious objectors. Claims by members of
Jehovah's Witnesses and others to exemption on one or another ground,
were frequently rejected. Many registrants, refusing to submit to
75. 66 Sup. Ct. 826 (U. S. 1946).
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induction, were then indicted. When, in the criminal courts, they at-
tempted to challenge the draft boards' actions, they were met with the
contention that the only way in which such actions could be reviewed
was in habeas corpus proceedings after induction.
When this problem first came before the Supreme Court, decision
was avoided on the ground that the draft board's misconstruction of
the law had been eliminated as the basis of the induction order by a
finding of General Hershey to the effect that the registrant in the case
was not sincere in his opposition to war.7 6 Soon afterwards the Court
ruled that the administrative error could not be challenged until after
compliance with the order.7 This was widely interpreted as requiring
actual submission to induction. But the Billings v. Truesdell decision 11
suggested a solution. There the Court ruled that a registrant could
avoid being inducted into the army by complying with the draft board
order in every respect, yet at the point of induction refusing to take an
oath. When, therefore, this precise method had been. followed, the
Supreme Court, after the war was over, decided 11 that arbitrary or
illegal action by a draft board might be challenged at a criminal trial
for refusal to take the oath. Unfortunately, this clarification of pro-
cedure came too late to help most of the registrants who had been
unwilling to take the oath upon induction.
The Supreme Court has reviewed two other draft convictions. In
one case it reversed a conviction because the evidence showed that the
registrant had kept the board sufficiently advised of his address.8" In
the other it affirmed, by a vote of five to four, on the ground that the
statute was not restricted to conspiracies to interfere with the draft
by force or violence. 81 But so far the Supreme Court has refused to
review any case dealing with the merits of draft board classification,
although it has been several times asked to do so.8
76. Bowles v. United States, 319 U. S. 33 (1943) (opinion per curiam; dissenting opinion
by Mr. Justice Jackson in which Mr. Justice Reed joined).
77. Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944) (opinion by Mr. Justice Black, con-
curring opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge; dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy).
78. Billings v. Truesdell, Maj. Gen., U. S. A., 321 U.S. 542 (1944) (opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas, concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter; dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Roberts).
79. Estep v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 423 (U. S. 1946) (opinion by Mr. Justice Doug-
las, concurring opinion by Messrs. Justices Murphy and Frankfurter. The latter dissented
from the basis of the majority but approved reversal on different grounds having no general
application; dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Burton, joined by the Chief Justice, who
agreed with Mr. Justice Frankfurter to the extent that he differed from the majority).
80. Bartchy v. United States, 319 U. S. 484 (1943) (opinion by Mr. Justice Reed; dis-
senting opinion by Mr. Justice Stone, in which Mr. Justice Roberts joined).
81. Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 (1945) (opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas; dis-
senting opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Messrs. Justices Roberts, Murphy
and Rutledge).
82. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lynn v. Downer, 140 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944),
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III
What conclusions can we draw from these varying decisions? Clearly
the majority of the Court is reluctant to enunciate constitutional prin-
ciples of broad application and tries, whenever possible, to decide cases
on narrow grounds. Also, the majority is generally reluctant to upset
executive action when it has been authorized by Congress. The Jap-
anese-American evacuation orders were thus upheld because approved
by Congress, but the continued detention of Japanese-Americans and
the military trials of Hawaiian civilians were condemned because
Congress had not authorized such acts.83 It is noteworthy also that
during this war period no congressional enactment dealing with per-
sonal liberties has been considered unconstitutional even by a dis-
:senting justice. 3
The war has brought about the final dissolution of the Black, Douglas
and Murphy trio, who for so many years had been liberal dissenters."
Only Justice Murphy has remained a consistent upholder of liberty,
joined frequently by Justice Rutledge. Surprisingly, Justice Black has
often been on the other side. And most unexpected of all was the posi-
tion of the late Chief Justice "I who at one time had often joined with
Holmes and Brandeis in famous dissents. It is a far cry from his posi-
tion in the first flag salute case 81 to his dissent in Bridges v. Wixon,
where important constitutional problems were brushed aside as being
unworthy of serious consideration. The Chief Justice failed to dissent
in any of the cases in which the majority decided against liberty and
dissented in all but three of those cases in which the position of the
government was overruled.
And the practical results? Denaturalization because of opinion was
stopped and prosecution for mere anti-war statements discouraged.
The right of loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry to leave detention
camps was proclaimed, but at a time when most of those affected had
cert. denied 322 U. S. 756 (1944) on ground that the case had become moot. This care in-
-volved the question of segregation of races. See also United States ex rel. Trainin v. Cain,
144 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied 323 U. S. 795 (1945), which involved denial
-of arabbi's claim to exemption; and Swatzka v. Sullivan, 148 F. (2d) 965 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945),
xert. denied 66 Sup. Ct. 90 (U. S. 1945). This case involved deferment of an agricultural
worker. Denial of certiorari in the latter case is particularly regrettable because the District
Court had upheld the registrant's contention.
83. Mr. Justice Roberts intimated, however, that since Congrers had ratified detention
of Japanese-Americans by appropriating money for that purpose, its action was as uncon-
stitutional as the detention itself. Exnparle Endo, 323 U.S. 283,310.
84. See Fraenkel, Civil Liberties Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1941 Term (1942) 91
U. oF PA. L. REv. 1, 27.
85. Indeed, it was Mr. Justice Stone, who first indicated that in civil liberties cases the
presumption of constitutionality was less potent than in other cases, United States v.Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938) at 152, n. 4.
86. Minersvifle School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940).
87. 326 U.S. 135, 178 (1945).
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already been released. A method was found to permit draftees to chal-
lenge arbitrary draft board action without actually becoming part of
the armed forces first,, but opportunities to clarify the law in time to be
of real help were passed by. The Supreme Court also ruled that the
treason clause of the Constitution meant what it said and that, in ex-
tending the Constitution to Hawaii, Congress had not intended to limit
its application and permit military trials of civilians.
On the other hand, the area of liberty has been narrowed by the
rulings which allowed a state to ban a man from practicing law because
he was a pacifist, which sanctioned the death sentences imposed on
Japanese generals despite the strong belief of dissenting judges that
they had not had fair trials and which permitted the mass evacuation
from the West Coast of all persons of Japanese ancestry, aliens and
citizens alike. War remains a restricter of liberty.
